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Abstract: The formerly dissident status of the essay film has, in recent years, been 
exchanged for a great deal of favorable attention both inside and outside of academia. In the 
more overly moralistic commentary on the form, the contemporary essay film is submitted 
as a tactical response to a surfeit of audiovisual media, to an era in which most of us have 
become both consumers and producers of a digital deluge. The work of Adam Curtis is 
notably absent from these ongoing debates. Yet Curtis is far from an underground figure—
he has been making essayistic films for the BBC for more than twenty years and was the 
first to produce work directly for the iPlayer platform. Using archival images to examine 
the present, his films produce counterintuitive connections and abrupt collisions that 
supplant the authority of narrative causality for a precarious network of associations and 
linkages. This article treats Curtis’s recent body of work diagnostically. It argues that, quite 
apart from any promise of escape or deliverance, the aesthetic form of his work actively 
inhabits the rhythms and vectors of contemporary media. For Curtis, the media-
technological conditions of the twenty-first century provoke a crisis that is both political 
and epistemological, one in which sensemaking can no longer claim to take place at a 
distance from the infrastructure that mediates such processes but is instead thoroughly and 
inescapably immanent to them, a situation that prevents contact with the outside. His films 
are about what he calls “destabilized perception”, but importantly they are also a function 
of this condition, one that in turn demands a shift in how we conceive the essay film in the 
twenty-first century. 
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The hot ticket of the 2009 Manchester International Festival was a strange, immersive 
theater production staged across several floors of a derelict office building. After ascending 
in a cramped elevator, visitors would be left to explore an abundance of uncanny spaces 
staged to emulate scenes and evoke stories from mid-twentieth century American culture: 
an eerie abandoned film set, a meticulously manicured suburban home, an ominously 
decorated dressing room, a facsimile of a CIA office, and so on. Along the way, jump scare 
tricks, sound cues, and a scattering of performers would encourage visitors to scrutinize a 
range of media, including paranoid letters, portentous radio broadcasts, and mysteriously 
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redacted documents. Eventually, at the center of this haunted house, visitors would arrive at 
the screening of an essay film by Adam Curtis. 
Composed of archive film from the 1950s and 1960s, together with clips from 
Hollywood cinema and accompanied by a soundtrack of American pop music, It Felt like a 
Kiss (2009) begins with a series of title cards. It announces that previously orienting stories, 
the stories underlying a liberal project that used to “make sense of the world,” have fallen 
apart, leaving nothing but “fragments” which haunt us in the present “like half-forgotten 
dreams.” Having traversed and investigated the staged remnants of these stories—these 
tableaux of the material and technological conditions within which sensemaking occurs and 
through which power is deployed—visitors to the show were prompted to reflect on how 
nightmarish the dreams of the twentieth century have become. It is the collapse of one into 
the other that provides the focus for Curtis’s entire body of work. He would later describe It 
Felt like a Kiss as an experiment in which he sought to convey this collapse both 
analytically and emotionally (Curtis 2012b), an aesthetic experiment in which the film 
itself, as a discrete object, renders infrastructural stories if not exactly visible then in some 
way sensorial. 
Infrastructure may seem like an odd term to use to describe stories. Indeed, at a time 
when there is increasing unanimity about the objects and materials addressed by an 
emergent critical infrastructure studies—essentially “stuff you can kick” (Parks 2015)—
employing the term in any other way necessarily invites a certain level of skepticism. Yet 
infrastructural forms are not limited to the pipelines, power grids, and highway systems 
ordinarily evoked by the term—infrastructure can be social and cultural, too. In fields like 
organization theory, for example, there is already a long-standing concern for how 
narrative, as well as storytelling, “directs action and interaction, in the same way in which 
 3 
an infrastructure of roads and signs enables and constrains” (Deuten and Rip 2000: 71). 
Here narrative infrastructure is not just a metaphor—it describes the constitutive and 
material agency of stories, their powers of mediation and organization. Keller Easterling, an 
architectural and urban theorist, negotiates a path between these two positions by 
describing the relation between “object forms” and “active forms” (2014: 90). In her 
account, stories can be active forms, beyond the obvious content or message: they can be 
understood operationally in the way that they coordinate affective capacities, induce a 
certain “disposition” (72) and suppress or otherwise redirect social potential. Stories can, 
then, have a political force in the world by mediating our perception of it, which is to say 
that by sinking into the background, by operating as part of the “technological 
nonconscious” (Hayles 2006), stories can be world making. Such stories are not simply 
ideological, where agency is understood to be located with human authors who seek to 
deploy them like political tools, but instead comprise a background with its own agency, a 
background with which humans remain relationally entangled. It is only at moments of 
political transition, moments initially experienced as “infrastructural failure” or “glitch” 
(Berlant 2016: 393), that stories formerly operating in this background can be grasped more 
directly. 
The media theorist McKenzie Wark describes the production of an infrastructural 
background in terms of successive processes of abstraction. In his account of the most 
recent stage, the geography and spaces of the built environment become overlaid by “an 
information landscape,” an abstract “regime of communication where information can 
travel faster than people or things” (2012: 34). These are infrastructural conditions that 
elude conventional modes of knowledge and perception, but they are also precarious 
conditions. Though stories still “exist in advance” (63), administering and mobilizing 
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factive experience, there is also a tendency toward more anomalous events—glitches where 
stories no longer function as they should and cannot be contained by familiar narratives. 
What is at stake here is the capacity to perceive complex procedures that shape our being-in 
and becoming-with the world, together with our understanding of this condition. This is 
politically important because such processes of mediation, although originary to the human 
(Kember and Zylinska 2012: 13–18), have in the digital era transformed and intensified, not 
least because the scales and speeds of communicational infrastructures are designed to be 
concealed, to blend in, to become naturalized. These abstract spaces may not be under the 
naively instrumental control of humans, but it is in such spaces where power relations are 
performed. Ultimately this means that it is now more important than ever to recognize 
stories as logistical and organizational rather than exclusively narratival—a form privileged 
by literary modernity. The algorithmic logic of digital computation, for example, 
reactivates a premodern, nonnarrative mode of telling (Young 2017: 126–28), but the 
consequences of this situation, its impact on our ability to “make sense of the world,” as 
Curtis puts it, demands new modes of perception. 
In this article I claim that Curtis’s recent work, and particularly the films made since 
his experiment with It Felt like a Kiss, confronts the politics of infrastructure 
diagnostically, which is to say that these films provoke encounters with the active form, the 
operational logic of contemporary “stories” that is often distinct from or at odds with a 
narrative conveyed on the representational level. Following Easterling, this mode of 
sensemaking can be described in terms of “special aesthetic practices” (2014: 91), practices 
that I examine in the context of current debates about the essay film. 
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Special Aesthetic Practices 
Compared with the way that many film genres or modes tend toward classification, the 
essay film resists any straightforward capture. It is a practice of filmmaking best understood 
in terms of its sensibility, which inhabits a space somewhere between the more 
recognizable qualities of documentary, fiction, and experimental cinema, a space that has 
historically existed outside of the mainstream (Alter and Corrigan 2017: 5–6). In recent 
years though, this dissident status has been exchanged for a great deal of favorable 
attention: the essay film has been the subject of numerous festivals, conferences, books, and 
articles, both inside and outside of academia. There is, it is generally implied, something 
especially timely about this resurgence. It is reported that the essayistic form particularly 
appeals to digital natives, equipped as they are with a new visual literacy and technological 
capability (Sandhu 2013). The more overtly moralistic commentary on this relationship 
updates Jean-Luc Godard’s assertion that the essay film is “a form that thinks” (quoted in 
Corrigan 2011: 33) and submits the essay film as a tactical response to a surfeit of 
audiovisual media, to an era in which most of us have become both consumers and 
producers of a digital deluge. Against the threat of this accelerating torrent of commercial 
and phatic culture, the essay film is deployed as a life raft, affirmed for its potential to help 
us make sense of the world, to help us “stay afloat” (Lee 2017). 
By focusing on Curtis’s recent work, notably absent from critical discussion of the 
form, I offer a different take on the contemporary essay film. In fact, Curtis is far from an 
underground figure: largely feted in the United Kingdom for his intelligent, politically 
engaged television work, he has won several British Academy of Film and Television 
awards. Beginning work for the BBC in the 1980s, Curtis started as a researcher for a 
magazine program he has since both dismissed as “trash television” and credited with 
instructing him in how to “tell stories about the workings of political power, in ways that 
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political journalists didn’t understand” (Curtis 2012a). After moving on to produce and 
direct various factual programs for the BBC, Curtis sought to tell such stories by gradually 
taking on more complex topics and by exploring broader themes. He has subsequently been 
making essayistic films for more than twenty years, initially for conventional broadcast on 
the BBC, and more recently for the iPlayer streaming platform. However, due to numerous 
rights restrictions and, Curtis claims, the conservative attitude of many international 
broadcasters (Jeffries 2005), viewers beyond the United Kingdom are unlikely to encounter 
his work in either context. In the United States, for example, where he has also received 
significant attention, his films have instead been formally exhibited in gallery spaces, 
subject to special screenings, or feature regularly at a handful of festivals.1 Even in the 
United Kingdom, restrictions over rights to music and archive material mean that his 
broadcast films are not readily accessible though official channels. Hence, given that 
bootleg copies of much of his recent work are widely available online, it is of course more 
likely that viewers in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere will first encounter 
his films via video-hosting platforms like YouTube or via torrent file sharing. As will 
become clear, these are altogether appropriate mediums of access. 
The institutional context of his filmmaking is, however, not incidental. According to 
Curtis (2011), it is his unique access to the BBC’s archives that allows him to “write with 
images,” a process that Curtis (2015) says involves searching through cataloged film 
materials and misclassified materials and exploring what he calls “different kinds of 
recorded realities,”, such as those stored on “Comp” tapes, used for decades to 
automatically record satellite feeds regardless of what was being transmitted, together with 
the longer unedited rushes from which much shorter news reports were created. He also has 
an assistant who travels to BBC offices around the world in order to digitize “hundreds of 
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thousands of hours” of material (Curtis 2015). Back in London, Curtis watches this material 
on fast forward, until, he says, something catches his eye. In his account, the key to this 
technique of writing with images is his “pattern brain” (Curtis 2011) and “associative way 
of thinking” (quoted in Lethem 2016). What he writes are “stories”—which is typically 
how each film announces itself—alternative stories that aim to problematize those that have 
become dominant in mediating our perception of the present. Curtis is interested in how 
power is mediated by stories of freedom, individualism, and technological utopianism and 
how, in the wreckage of grand narratives, our capacity for resistance has suffered a similar 
collapse. Accordingly, his own stories revisit “fragments from the past to examine the 
present” (Curtis 2012a). 
It is the aesthetic form of this examination that I reflect on here. Quite apart from 
any promise of escape or deliverance, it is my contention that Curtis’s work—and 
particularly the films that followed It Felt like a Kiss—actively inhabit the rhythms and 
vectors of contemporary media and, in doing so, express a state of “destabilized 
perception,” to adopt a term used by Curtis himself (Oh Dearism II, 2014). For Curtis, the 
media-technological conditions of the twenty-first century provoke a crisis that is both 
political and epistemological, one in which sensemaking can no longer claim to take place 
separate to the infrastructure that mediates such processes but is instead thoroughly and 
inescapably immanent to them, a situation that prevents contact with the outside. His films 
are about this crisis, but, importantly, they are a function of it, too. 
It is the political basis of this function that differentiates Curtis’s aesthetic practice 
from others that might appear similar, such as “cognitive mapping” (Jameson 1992), an 
aesthetic mode epitomized by a tendency in late twentieth-century American cinema 
toward narratives of conspiracy and paranoia. Curtis’s essay films undoubtedly share some 
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paranoiac qualities, although such paranoia is, of course, hardly a recent phenomenon. John 
Farrell (2006: 3) has described how paranoia is reflected in a much longer established 
cultural preoccupation with human agency, variously expressed in historical literature, and 
even, in the case of Cervantes’s Don Quixote—“the first great modern paranoid 
adventurer”—providing the background against which the form of the literary novel first 
emerged. As a major impulse in modern literature, anxieties about the human capacity to 
separate rational thought and accurate perception from persuasive fantasy and deceitful 
invention gradually became uncoupled from individual, psychological behavior and 
extended into a method of examining and representing Western society. Much of this 
concerned the social effects of media-technological changes, and it is with this in mind that 
Curtis (2012a) has spoken enthusiastically about John Dos Passos’s 1938 USA trilogy, with 
its fragmentary “newsreel” and “camera eye” mode of storytelling, which attempted to 
capture how perception had become newly organized according to the rhythms of mass 
media. 
For Fredric Jameson, this can become a political method—particularly under 
conditions of abstraction that we used to call postmodernism—for beginning to cognize a 
capitalist world system, “a system so vast that it cannot be encompassed by the natural and 
historically developed categories of perception with which human beings normally orient 
themselves” (1992: 2). Like the conspiracy dramas analyzed by Jameson, aspects of 
Curtis’s film essays confront the limits of representation allegorically, particularly through 
the arrangement of archive material. However, more generally the films cannot be “read” in 
this manner precisely because they do not work as part of Jameson’s “hermeneutic 
machine” (10). In Curtis’s films, paranoia is more fully expressed in the form, rather than 
according to the principle of suspicion that undergirds methods of interpretation. In fact, 
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this aesthetic mode of knowledge extends beyond Jameson’s ambition for a process that 
includes “the representation of its own media system within itself” (25), because here, 
where questions of agency extend beyond the human, it is no longer a matter of grasping 
the “deeper truth” of individual experience in its connection with this system (16) but is 
instead a matter of entering into affective encounters with a truth that is always already 
mediated. 
It is in this sense that I am less interested in what Curtis’s films might tell us about 
him as a practitioner (and why we should critique or celebrate his technique) than I am in 
the extent to which this work can be seen to provide what Gilles Deleuze called a 
“symptomatological picture” of the present (1998: xvii). This means that, instead of being 
symptoms of the filmmaker’s own auteurism (as tends to be the focus of conventional 
writing on the essay film), the aesthetics and storytelling logic of Curtis’s films diagnose 
the symptoms of a media environment from which his practice emerges, and from which 
any separation remains impossible. Curtis is an essayist of and for the “post-truth” era, an 
era of “infoglut” (Andrejevic 2013) in which simple narratives fail to convince, in which 
any story is treated with suspicion, and in which the weaponization of such conditions 
threatens to render all perception unstable. 
Here I attend to the diagnostic function of Curtis’s body of work in terms of its 
recurrent tendencies rather than on the basis of close analysis of individual films. This is 
important because since 2009 the series of films he has produced for broadcast and for the 
iPlayer can effectively be understood as a single, ongoing project, despite their apparently 
different subjects and concerns. Indeed, it was in 2009 that Curtis also established a 
publicly accessible blog, with the suitably McLuhanesque name “The Medium and the 
Message,” that he used to gather the stories and to experiment with the video material that 
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would later feature in his films, some of it reused several times.2 To isolate the symptoms 
of destabilized perception, I identify how the aesthetics of this project provide dispositional 
knowledge about a “network” infrastructure through the production of encounters with its 
material intensities. First, though, it is necessary to examine the essay film form in more 
detail and to clarify why Curtis’s work remains largely unacknowledged by this emergent 
field of study. 
Two “Moments” of the Essay Film 
Despite collaborating with musicians, an experimental theater company, and a 
choreographer, Curtis (2005, 2017) thoroughly rejects the label of “artist” and instead 
persistently claims that his work is that of a journalist. This assertion—made while holding 
an apparently unique supradepartmental position at the BBC—has exposed him to 
increasingly pointed criticism, based primarily on the extent to which his practice seems to 
disregard the editorial values of the organization’s prestigious current affairs, documentary, 
and news output. Indeed, Curtis’s films attract a growing amount of criticism from 
commentators on both left and right and from either side of the so-called culture war. For 
some critics and bloggers, the fact that his films have been viewed positively on platforms 
favored by the alt-right, such as Breitbart News and InfoWars (Hudnall 2010; Finn 2015), 
adds to an increasing sense of unease concerning Curtis’s methods of filmmaking and 
regarding his political motives. Former admirers now caution against a case of “the 
emperor’s new clothes” (Hancox 2015) and characterize his technique as oversimplified 
“shtick” that draws its legitimacy from victimization (Heiser 2017). Conservative 
commentators, on the other hand, deride films that offer a “ludicrously one-sided account” 
inspired by “visions of ‘Amerika’ as the fount of all evil” and other “lurid, Michael Moore-
ish notions” (Davis 2004). 
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Nonetheless, by emphasizing the form of Curtis’s recent filmmaking, I wish to 
suggest that such criticism of his journalistic pretensions in fact reflects an emerging 
consensus on what characterizes the essay film. In making this claim, it is neither my 
intention to stage an investiture, whereby Curtis is retrospectively accepted into the canon, 
nor do I mean to defend him against his critics from either side of the political spectrum. 
After all, Curtis has resisted numerous attempts to draw association between his work and 
that of essay film grandees Jean-Luc Godard and Chris Marker (Curtis 2012a, 2012b). 
Instead, he describes his own filmmaking as “a sort of populism” (Curtis 2012a), one that is 
set against avant-garde elitism. 
Over the past decade, the narrative logic of his filmmaking has become increasingly 
subjective and speculative, characteristics that are considered fundamental to the essay film 
form in so far as it is distinguished from documentary (Elsaesser 2017: 240). These 
qualities are particularly apparent in the counterhegemonic truths Curtis’s work 
superficially presents to the viewer, truths that are never less than ambiguous. This is 
because, in comparison to earlier work, like The Mayfair Set (1999) and The Century of the 
Self (2002), where narrative is organized according to techniques relatively familiar to 
factual filmmaking, more recent work such as Bitter Lake (2015) and Hypernormalisation 
(2016) operate much more on the basis of association, apparently employing, as per 
Thomas Elsaesser’s description of essay film practice, “a patchwork of separate motifs 
quilted together by way of contrast or even clash” (2017: 241). It is, however, in regard to 
that other characteristic of the essay film, its reflexivity (Alter 2018: 22; Elsaesser 2017: 
242; Rascaroli 2009: 29–31), that Curtis’s work produces an encounter with a broader 
critique of the essayistic form in the twenty-first century. This encounter occurs in the 
apparent disjunction between content and form, between political argument and aesthetic 
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operation. Indeed, insofar as these films express the abstract space that conditions their 
possibility—typically conceptualized in terms of a network—his method supports the claim 
that the essayistic form is now “a dominant form of narrative in times of post-Fordist 
globalization” (Steyerl 2017: 276).3 
To make sense of this involves recognizing what, in Laura Rascaroli’s terms, we 
might call two “moments” of the essay film (2017: 2). The first, familiar, twentieth-century 
moment, saw essayistic modes of filmmaking emerge in response to the limitations of 
merely documenting, where it was assumed that the subject of the film—whatever it might 
be and no matter how complex—could be disassembled and represented to an observer 
directly (Richter 1940: 90). For avant-garde artist Hans Richter, often credited with initially 
conceiving the essayistic mode of filmmaking, such an approach mistook the world for 
machine. It therefore expressed the disciplinary, assembly-line logic that dominated the 
industrial era. Problems arise, he pointed out, when such methods are applied to phenomena 
that resist neat disassembly, complex phenomena like ideas and stories that can neither be 
placed in front of a camera nor made comprehensible through the inspection of their 
various components. But from this crisis, new possibilities arise too: tasked with the job of 
“visualizing notions of the imaginary” (90), the filmmaker was forced to explore escape 
routes from dominant modes of expression, discourse, and representation. The first moment 
of the essay film is, then, an explicitly political moment, precisely because it was 
“constitutively against its time” (Rascaroli 2017: 5), a sensibility later endorsed by Theodor 
Adorno’s contention that in its “violations of the orthodoxy of thought” the essayistic form 
is fundamentally heretical and transgressive (1958: 81). 
Insofar as it is set against the technocratic limitations of documentary rationality, 
Curtis’s essayistic populism can be understood as a response to the ongoing crisis that 
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triggered the form’s initial emergence. Though produced under the banner of a state 
broadcaster, his films often flaunt their epistemological distinction from more legitimate, 
accredited ways of knowing, thus demonstrating the inherent instability of any binary 
between “official” and “popular” knowledge (Birchall 2006: 18). Indeed, for Benjamin 
Moffitt, a breakdown in the distinction between popular and official knowledge, prompted 
in the present by newly intense processes of mediation, provides the “stage” for a 
contemporary mode of populism that should be understood in terms of its style (Moffitt 
2016: 31). Importantly, this style is not simply a function of political rhetoric or ideology, 
and it is “difficult to map on the traditional left-right divide” (45). 
For some critics, it is precisely because they adhere to this populist style that 
Curtis’s films are not to be trusted. Specifically, even though they espouse a liberal 
humanist perspective, these films play fast and loose with the qualities that are foundational 
to such a position: they lack objectivity, causal links are often dubious, and phenomena like 
dreams and strange coincidences often serve as evidence. Parodies of his work condemn the 
conspicuous use of pop music, clips from science fiction films, cartoonish sound effects, 
and numerous editing tricks, all of which are used to compensate for a discontinuous and 
incoherent narrative produced though abrupt collisions of subject matter, ideas, and 
material (Woodhams 2011; Applegate 2016). Though such criticism stems from concern 
about the extent to which Curtis violates documentary or journalistic orthodoxy, it is also 
borne out of a fear that he actively exploits the crisis outlined above and that his declarative 
statements about a “political and bureaucratic elite” (The Trap, 2007), delivered in either 
omniscient voiceover or sans serif type, are nothing more than a work of sophistry. In the 
words of one columnist, “In our post-truth times, it could be argued that Curtis himself is 
just another master manipulator. His array of jump cuts and abrupt narrative jack-knifes 
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arouse the suspicion that perhaps he’s simply the ultimate post-modernist; piecing together 
a diverting collage out of various picaresque shards of recent history and presenting it as 
the truth” (Harrison 2016). In short, Curtis is condemned for cynically capitalizing on 
conditions of attentional overload and “communicative abundance” (Moffitt 2016: 3), 
rather than surmounting such conditions. 
It is, however, for this reason that Curtis’s work should be understood in the context 
of a second moment of the essay film, a current and perhaps less familiar moment in which, 
as Hito Steyerl suggests, the essayistic form is symptomatic of the organization of 
postindustrial information economies, characterized by “the compulsory manufacturing of 
difference” (2017: 277), “extreme flexibilization, and distracted modes of attention” (276). 
Instead of the assembly line, this is an era of “control” (Deleuze 1992), an era of 
“semiocapitalism” (Berardi 2009) where surplus value is produced by fragmented and 
“creative” labor dependent on the logic of the network, a logic that permeates the whole of 
social life. For the media theorist Alexander Galloway (2014), this incursion also gives rise 
to a network fallacy, an erroneous reduction of everything to the network form. Evidence, 
he says, can be found in all sorts of realms. The gurus of social media see people as 
networks, literary theorists now read classic texts as networks, contemporary military 
strategists see the battlefield as a network, neuroscientists conceive the human brain as a 
network, contemporary philosophers understand ontology in terms of a network, and the 
list goes on and on: artists, architects, teachers, business leaders, “all have shifted 
prominently in recent years toward a network model” (Galloway 2014). For Galloway, this 
belief that “everything is a network” (Berry and Galloway 2016: 154) is akin to network 
fundamentalism, a dangerous limitation to our modes of thought with profound political 
consequences: the imagination of alternatives—all difference and otherness—is foreclosed, 
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already integrated and normalized within the network (157). In short, we find ourselves 
trapped in a state of what Galloway calls “network pessimism”: if everything is a network 
then it is not possible to think “in, through, or beyond networks, except in terms of 
networks themselves” (157). 
Curtis’s films confront and inhabit this aporia. He is, first, highly critical of thinking 
the world in terms of networks, particularly in regard to his assessment of the 
organizational practices of the left. According to the contrarian counterhistories depicted in 
his films, the worst excesses of the neoliberal present are due to a weakness of the left, a 
weakness that is neither simply the result of repressive state power nor the marketization of 
party politics but also comes from within. Since the three-part All Watched Over by 
Machines of Loving Grace (2011), this has been framed as a denunciation of the horizontal 
network. His position can, to a large extent, be characterized as a critique of what Nick 
Srnicek and Alex Williams have called “folk politics” (2015: 10), understood as the 
dominant political sensibility of the contemporary left which, they argue, is “out of joint 
with the actual mechanisms of power.” In terms that are remarkably similar to Curtis’s 
narration, Srnicek and Williams argue that the complex conditions of the present “outpace 
the narratives we use to structure and make sense of our lives” (13). In their account, the 
left’s “guiding intuition” toward spontaneous, temporary, and reactive practices draws on 
an organizational toolkit of protests, strikes, and occupations devised in response to specific 
historical conditions, conditions that are no longer recognizable. Jodi Dean (2016: 4) 
similarly criticizes the extent to which such practices tend toward a “celebration of 
autonomous individuality,” even as they affirm the power of connection. It is in this context 
that Curtis emphasizes the disappointments of large scale anti-war protests, and, in 
Hypernormalisation, the antiglobalization and Occupy movements in particular. His work 
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of the past decade has consistently reprimanded the privileging of political practices that 
remain rooted in a neoliberal subjectivity, where the universal is seen as “intrinsically 
totalitarian” (Srnicek and Williams 2015: 11), thus obviating the kind of counterhegemonic 
project he believes is necessary to achieve structural and systemic change. For Curtis, the 
gains of horizontalism are fundamentally limited by a lack of political idealism, by a lack of 
orientation toward the future and the confidence this inspires. When capitalism dominates 
the horizon of political thought and action, it seems like there is no choice but to “retreat 
into a dreamworld” (Hypernormalisation, 2016). 
For his critics, this position dangerously dismisses any politics of difference in favor 
of a regressive liberal humanist subject, one that is based on normative assumptions, 
obscures contingent power relations, and results in simplistic censure of certain groups—
women in particular (Heiser 2017). Underlying this is Curtis’s tendency toward sweeping 
generalization, and his apparent longing for a narrative of future-oriented progress that is in 
fact inseparable from modern capitalism. Indeed, it is due to the absence of an equivalent 
narrative in contemporary “leftist” politics that he rejects such a label and in interviews has 
instead expressed provocative sympathy for the confidence-inspiring narratives of neo-
conservatism and libertarianism, even if his films ultimately chart the ruinous consequences 
of such stories (Curtis 2012a, 2012b). Hence, quite apart from their radical sensibility, 
Curtis’s films have been condemned as articles of bad faith and as the epitome of collusion 
(Bond 2013). 
Significantly, though, this criticism is also based on the fact that his films have 
increasingly taken on the form of networks. They often begin by establishing story as a set 
of nodal points. Bitter Lake begins by pinpointing particular locations and dates—Helmand 
Province, 1953; Wall Street, 1993; The Planet Solaris, 1972; and so on—important, it is 
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implied, in their specificity and connection. It Felt like a Kiss begins with a roll call of its 
key players—Saddam Hussein, Doris Day, and Enos the Chimp, among others—with the 
promise that previously unseen connections will be mapped between these disparate 
individuals. It is for this reason that his critics accuse him of perpetuating a “conspiratorial” 
explanation of social inertia and personal disempowerment, where patterns and associations 
purport to reveal otherwise hidden truths (Bond 2013; Hancox 2015; Heiser 2017). There 
is, it is suggested, something dangerous about his outsider’s perspective, in that it seeks to 
flatter the viewer and, in doing so, to act as gateway drug to a more irrational and paranoid 
mode of perception. 
It is though my contention that Curtis’s populist aesthetic is entirely appropriate to 
the politics of the present, not because these films offer an intervention in the form of an 
alternative narrative but, rather, because they engage reflexively with the infrastructural 
conditions that mediate any story told about this present. In doing so, they grapple with the 
fact that today’s epistemological orthodoxy unsettles rather nostalgic ideas surrounding the 
heretical powers of the essay film. As Steyerl puts it, “Essays . . . are no longer the exotic 
‘other’ of a drab and repetitive social reality. They now look amazingly similar to the 
collaged daily schedule of any contemporary working mom, to a zapping spree with a 
voiceover, or maybe just to a Sunday afternoon remix contest on YouTube” (2017: 277–
78). In the twenty-first century, speculative truths and associational forms are simply 
expressions of a network imaginary that has become infrastructurally naturalized. Curtis’s 
films operate in a world already subject to endless estrangement, a culture no longer 
susceptible to aesthetic practices of disruption, alienation, and defamiliarization. One of the 
important consequences of this shift is that it becomes necessary to alter the basis for 
analyzing such a cultural work—rather than privileging its apparent status as an “agent of 
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change” (Birchall 2006: 26), we should instead consider how its mode of sensemaking 
functions diagnostically and how in conditions of network pessimism this mode of 
sensemaking might take a form previously deemed irrational (60). Aesthetic practices like 
these may in fact offer no attempt to alleviate the symptoms of crisis, but in the exhibition 
and amplification of infrastructural conditions, we are made aware of how stories are 
mediated, even as our reality continues to be constructed by their active forms, a situation 
that should at the very least problematize our tendency to presuppose their political value. 
The remainder of this article examines this idea in detail. 
Destabilized Perception 
In her recent theorization of the essay film’s heretical and resistant power of thought, 
Rascaroli emphasizes the creation of “in-between spaces,” produced through “dialectical” 
disjunction (2017: 8). Leaning on Deleuze’s dialectic of difference, developed in his film 
philosophy, she argues that techniques of juxtaposition open up gaps and interstices 
through which images become “radically external to each other” (10). Essayistic interstices 
disrupt the otherwise indiscernible flow of filmic time and draw attention to the medium’s 
own construction. For Rascaroli, these spaces of possibility enable connections with the 
outside, with the virtual, with the new, and so for works associated with what I am here 
calling the “first moment” of the essay film, connection through disjunction is central to the 
functioning of the form. Of course the Deleuzian outside—affirmed through such 
connection—is not a transcendent position from which difference becomes subject to 
homogenization but is instead an immanent outside, a position of middleness-in-itself from 
which difference is preserved and produced. Yet under conditions of network pessimism, 
the very status of the outside is subject to another kind of enclosure. 
 19 
Though the network era is superficially characterized as a time of continuous flux 
and flow, with connection stimulating change and possibility, the philosopher Frédéric 
Neyrat argues that the twenty-first century should in fact be recognized as a moment of 
“absolute flux,” one in which the “flux of information, capital, and affects” generates a 
strange continuity, experienced as a feeling of constant travel without movement (2018: 3). 
It is in this context that Galloway, for example, warns against a certain reading of Deleuze 
that is all too easily co-opted by a neoliberal brand of affirmationist thinking familiar to 
techno-utopianism. A fervent rejection of transcendence and concomitant celebration of 
connection, decentralization, and difference is, after all, the lingua franca of Silicon Valley 
and ventriloquized in the TED Talk. For Neyrat, a state of absolute flux “corresponds to a 
certain ontological regime, that of saturated immanence, in which everything remains 
perpetually inside, without any hope of an exit” (4). We should, then, pay more attention to 
the Deleuze, who, in describing emergent societies of control, understood that the 
instrumentalization of immanence prompts the necessity to “look for new weapons” (1992: 
6) rather than cleave to those honed in battle against a transcendent absolute. 
It is the malfunctioning of particular aesthetic weapons that triggers the mode of 
reflexivity exemplified in Curtis’s films, a mode of destabilized perception. This distinction 
from the more industrial infrastructural circumstances that gave rise to the first moment of 
the essay film is bound up with a broader shift in the present, one in which mediated 
perception is already “instinctively reflexive” (Citton 2017: 164), one in which “media 
tends to theorizes itself” (Rombes 2009: 6). According to Nicholas Rombes, this is a 
symptom of digital culture, where, quite apart from the promise of “hyper-clarified reality” 
(1), which extends from presumptions around increasing transparency (measured in line 
with the amount of information available) and increasing perfection (which imagines a 
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lossless, more detailed encounter with the world), there is in fact a tendency for digital 
media to highlight its own construction, imperfection, and obscurity. Crucially, Rombes 
argues that media in the digital age no longer lay bare the device as an act of transgression 
against dominant conventions, codes, or rules, nor is this reflexivity a simple matter of self-
knowing irony. Instead, there is a growing tendency in contemporary television, cinema 
and videogames toward a “built-in mode of deconstruction” (62). Curtis’s films share 
formal features with “hyperlink cinema” (Quart 2005), “puzzle films” (Buckland 2009), 
“complex TV” (Mittell 2015), and narratives of epistemological reversal (Galloway 2006: 
94), all of which pose serious questions about the ontology of media infrastructures. 
Such media operate after the stability afforded by Aristotelian narrative form, and 
the viewing subject it presumes, has given way. It was of course possible to perceive this 
classical form in its entirety precisely because of a stability—no matter how artificial or 
deceptive—derived from causality, linearity, and finitude, qualities that maintained and 
circumscribed narrative structure (Franklin 2015: 150). Curtis’s films explore the 
impossibility of this totalizing perspective, the impossibility of encountering a story from a 
point of separation, and they experiment with a mode of sensemaking appropriate to such 
conditions. He describes such a practice as attempting to convey “what it feels like to live 
through history as an experience rather than a grand story” (Curtis 2010). His films map a 
multiplicity of connections, but he denies “positing a direct causal relationship” and instead 
insists that such relations function aesthetically and affectively: “I’m trying to actually do 
an emotionally coherent film as much as an intellectually coherent film because actually I 
think that increasingly a lot of people think like that” (Curtis 2011).4 It seems clear that this 
sensibility is transmitted not by reasserting stability, not through a violation of the 
orthodoxy but by further unsettling any stability and thus intensifying the orthodoxy to the 
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point where the procedural arrangement of what he calls “a terrible, terrible prison” 
becomes affectively intelligible (Curtis 2012a). In Curtis’s own terms, we can describe this 
as an infrastructural aesthetic of “destabilized perception,” an idea explored throughout his 
work but expressed in these precise terms in the short film Oh Dearism II, broadcast on the 
BBC as part of an episode of Charlie Brooker’s satirical Screenwipe, and revisited in 
Hypernormalisation. 
Curtis attributes the term destabilized perception to the political technologist 
Vladislav Surkov, a senior and altogether Machiavellian adviser to Vladimir Putin. In 
accounts of contemporary Russian politics much is made of Surkov’s former stint as a 
theater director, his love of conceptual art, countercultural poetry, and gangsta rap, and of 
the rock lyrics, science fiction stories, and satirical novel that he has written (Pomerantsev 
2015: 81–87, 278). Surkov is held responsible for a new aestheticization of politics, for 
reworking avant-garde technique into a populist style that underlies “directed democracy” 
(Wilson 2005: 50). It is often implied that the key to this can be found in his own creative 
works. 
Almost Zero, for example, a novel credited to “Natan Dubovitsky” but widely 
believed to have been written by Surkov, was originally published as a special 2009 edition 
of the literary magazine Russian Pioneer. It is undoubtedly tempting to scour the recent 
unauthorized English translation for clues as to his political maneuvering (Surkov 2017). 
After all, the novel—a postmodern crime story set in a violent world of publishing and 
public relations—includes descriptions of false identities, fake news, and performative 
debates where everyone involved has been manipulated, knowingly or unknowingly, to 
adopt a certain position within a managed system. This all resonates with Surkov’s early 
political career at the Kremlin, when he channeled funds both to nongovernmental 
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organizations and to the nationalist groups that opposed them, supported provocative arts 
festivals and the fundamentalist religious groups that condemned such work, and 
encouraged all sorts of independent movements while at the same time ensuring that their 
emergence was preemptively integrated into a system of false opposition, where 
oppositions are multiplied to the point where the basis for that opposition is obscured 
(Pomerantsev 2015: 78–79). 
Accordingly, when it was revealed, a few months after the initial publication of 
Almost Zero, that “Natan Dubovitsky” was in fact a pseudonymous riff on Surkov’s wife’s 
maiden name, some commentators were quick to assume that by drawing attention to 
himself he had “given the game away” (Stott 2009), divulging the secrets of his dark 
political arts. For Curtis, though, it is more important to recognize how the disclosure itself 
functions as part of Surkov’s political operations, as a way of drawing attention to 
techniques of manipulation and, in doing so, destabilizing the ground upon which political 
activity might take place. In his coy denials of authorship, and in his own wildly 
contradictory reviews of the book (Pomerantsev 2015: 82), Surkov actively encourages 
unresolvable speculation about his association with the novel, speculation that remains 
beholden to the same management of difference described in its pages. It is the debilitating 
effect of such techniques that Curtis detects in the politics of the United States and United 
Kingdom, a situation he describes, in Hypernormalisation, as a “constant vaudeville of 
contradictory stories that makes it impossible for any real opposition to emerge because 
they can’t counter it with a coherent narrative of their own.” 
Needless to say, Curtis is not the only one to fear such influence. In Special Council 
Robert Mueller’s investigation into attempts to manipulate the 2016 US presidential 
election, the Saint Petersburg–based Internet Research Agency is accused of operating with 
 23 
the explicit aim of “spread[ing] distrust towards the candidates and the political system in 
general” (United States Department of Justice 2018: 6). Mueller’s indictment refers to a 
series of Surkovian techniques, including the use of political advertising on social media 
platforms and the stage management of political rallies. The latter, for example, allegedly 
involved the organization of several events in November 2016: rallies that both supported 
president-elect Trump and protested against the legitimacy of his victory (23). In such 
circumstances, singular stories are beset with an inherent volatility, a precariousness that 
renders them fallible to collapse. Our encounter with the world is destabilized by design. 
This, Curtis says, is “the strange mood of our time” (Oh Dearism II, 2014). Yet in spite of 
any apparent attempt to offer transcendent perspective on this time, his films actually and 
necessarily remain immanent to the network through which its mood is mediated. This is 
because contradictory stories are not just the work of political demiurges but are, more 
important, an expression of the operational procedures and distributed agencies with which 
we are obliged to engage when encountering such stories. 
As Curtis deploys it, then, destabilized perception is an aesthetic mode that 
confronts and explores the network problematic without resolving it. In recent studies of 
similar “network aesthetics,” this involves “opting in completely” (Jagoda 2016: 225) and 
abandoning any attempts to escape such infrastructure. For Patrick Jagoda, it is, however, 
also a process that involves “slowing down and learning to inhabit a compromised 
environment” (225). His proposal is more pragmatic than affirmative, but it still seeks to 
utilize the power of in-between spaces. It involves being attentive to the “ordinary 
situations” (5) of the network, its banalities, its boredom, its humanness; it is only through 
such “thoughtful reflection” (228) that we might defend against the velocity of digital 
culture, its incessant speeding up of all things. Such exercises in restabilization are 
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motivated by a certain asceticism, they mourn the debilitation of attentional capacity and 
the loss of deep attention associated with a literary mode of sensemaking. Attending to 
ordinary situations is therefore a cognitive, intellectual process, where aesthetic 
practitioners can act as “auxiliary nurses for our attention” (Citton 2017: 156), by 
administering restorative and resistant temporalities through an arrangement of material 
that disjunctively contests the flux. 
There are many such ordinary situations in Curtis’s recent films: politicians are 
caught daydreaming, a soldier pets a bird on the battlefield, people of all kinds dance, 
together and alone. Often, though, these situations are piled on top of one another, part of a 
thick, compressed visual experience, one that is hardly nursing. Indeed, the form of his 
recent work operates against the assumption that contemplative reflection is the best 
response to a situation where the object of scarcity is attention. At its most extreme, such as 
in a sequence of It Felt like a Kiss set to Tina Turner’s “River Deep, Mountain High,” 
Curtis subjects the viewer to a frenetic, bewildering assault, cutting from image to image in 
only a fraction of a second. Here, all images, all situations, are commensurable: the 
singularity of each image subordinated to “an ontology of general equivalence thoroughly 
consistent with capitalism” (Neyrat 2018: 7). Here, inhabiting the network involves 
attention overload, it means drawing attention to attention, to attention as a collective 
phenomenon subject to organization and control. 
Recent analysis of contemporary television storytelling identifies similar practices. 
Jason Mittell, for example, describes an “operational aesthetic” (2015: 42), where attention 
is elicited and stimulated less by questions surrounding how a story might unfold and more 
from an uncertainty over what formal steps will be required to connect the dots, to resolve a 
complex set of distributed story stands and accomplish a feat of “narrative pyrotechnics” 
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(43). In a typical Curtis narrative, this uncertainty is induced by the continual undercutting 
of expectation, exemplified by the repeated use of but in voice and onscreen text. All 
Watched Over by Machines of Loving Grace is replete with examples: “But then,” “But in 
fact,” “But at this very moment,” “But even as this was happening,” “But in reality,” “But 
this was a fantasy,” “But it was an illusion.” Regulated by a form that is simultaneously 
repetitive and volatile, the viewer is continually changing direction, responding to an 
update, following a new link. The difference here is that exaggerated linkage smothers the 
possibility of any pyrotechnics—Curtis’s patterns are precariously arranged and lack 
authority. The significance of particular dates is never entirely clear. Any rational 
connection between key players remains obscure. This is particularly true of his films made 
directly for the iPlayer platform, encouraging as it does pausing, rewinding, and otherwise 
analyzing labyrinthine arguments that, in the case of Hypernormalisation, run for almost 
three hours. Devoting closer attention to films that, as Curtis says, “deliberately . . . show 
the joins,” in fact emphasizes that “there’s no reason you can’t join any two pieces of film 
up” (quoted in Lethem 2016). In other words, there is no limit to the number of connections 
that can be made. This does not simply mean that narrative becomes open-ended. It means 
instead that narrative takes on an accumulative and interrupted form—proceeding, and 
halting, and proceeding, without resolution (Franklin 2015: 165; Young 2017: 127). More 
significant, it means that such interruption operates according to a strange logic of 
divergence without exclusion, disjunction without separation. 
This is because his films often elide traditional principles of montage. Curtis selects 
material on the basis of its “sensibility” (Curtis 2012a) rather than according to how it 
might sustain attention or stabilize a rational argument—he is guided by the creation of 
“mood” (Curtis 2015). His juxtapositions preserve the intensity of images but frequently 
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elide any conflict. Individual juxtapositions do clash—such as when the aftermath of 
appalling moments of violence, accompanied by a pop music soundtrack, is butted up 
against a scene of comedic absurdity—but the sheer array of such clashes often tips over 
into something else: difference is not flattened out, in the form contradiction, nor is there a 
stabilizing move toward synthesis.5 Instead, in Deleuzian terms, destabilized perception is 
expressed in the form of disjunctive synthesis, where the conflict that drives narrative exists 
as “a plurality of coexisting oppositions” (Deleuze 2004: 255). The form of Curtis’s films 
actively works against the conflation of difference into a harmonious single narrative. 
For the early Deleuze, this disjunctive mode of synthesis is fundamentally 
affirmative. Instead of acting to limit or exclude—instead of acting negatively—it is 
generated by a process of disjunction that remains disjunctive, that does not reduce reality 
to the actual but remains open to the virtual (Deleuze 1990: 174). The various connections 
explored by these films—connections between computer engineering, economic policy, 
military strategy, countercultural movements, and genre fiction—introduce yet further 
difference, further variation, further potentials. Importantly, though, such connections 
function here as an ambivalent corrective to any latent belief in the power of disruption. 
Here, any encounter with the outside, in spite of apparent tension, is already subject to 
control, which is to say they are encounters with a banal outside, an outside rendered fake, 
one that is not antagonistic to the logic of contemporary power but corresponds to and 
intensifies its operation. In the prison of a society of control, disjunctive synthesis is 
revealed as one of the old weapons, one that can only reorient perception toward the 
functioning of the new media orthodoxy. The stories told in Curtis’s films do not inform us 
about the present, nor do the images he arranges lend themselves to interpretation. Instead, 
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these stories render aesthetically sensible what cannot be resolved hermeneutically—they 
demand that we encounter them literally, as infrastructure. 
Infrastructural Aesthetics 
Curtis’s body of work evidently fails the political test set by the cinematic form of the 
essayistic film: it does not violate the orthodoxy of its time. Nor, on the level of form, do 
his films identify new weapons, insofar as these might be understood in terms of new 
aesthetic practices for “cutting through the information clutter” (Andrejevic 2013: 4), new 
ways to manage and navigate the contemporary media environment in order to become 
stably and coherently informed. Indeed, in proliferating and multiplying potential accounts 
of reality, Curtis deploys techniques familiar to the politics of what Mark Andrejevic has 
called “the postmodern right” (6), where any specific narrative—dominant or 
oppositional—is subjected to a saturation effect that threatens to neutralize critique entirely. 
The logical organization of Curtis’s films prompt conditions of uncertainty similar to those 
in which the outcome of elections, the status of a president’s birth certificate, and the 
scientific evidence for global warming can all be thrown into doubt. It is, then, tempting to 
condemn this as a form of trolling, to understand his technique as the realization of an alt-
right dream to “expose and heighten the contradictions within the system” (Hood 2015), a 
technique that at best maintains the status quo and at worst is dangerously nihilistic. I have, 
however, treated his work symptomatologically, as a series of films that provoke aesthetic 
encounters with storytelling infrastructure, a media environment that functions largely 
invisibly even as it conditions entangled practices of knowing and being. What, then, is the 
final diagnosis? What are the implications of this portrait of symptoms? 
First, Curtis’s films experiment with a mode of sensemaking that is both appropriate 
and necessary to a moment of destabilized perception, a moment when the object of 
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study—the referent—cannot be grasped by conventional means of representation. This is a 
logic of sense triggered by the very fact that Curtis, an essayist of the digital whether he 
likes it or not, is incapable of presenting a singular story that can be apprehended as 
accurate, rational, or trustworthy. His films therefore make sense of the present as a 
moment of “impasse” (Berlant 2011: 4); they render sensible a state of network pessimism 
or what Lauren Berlant also characterizes as the “cruel optimism” of this present, where the 
affirmation of the essayistic form, aligned to a political project of connection through 
disjunction, is on the one hand what provides “temporary housing” (5) for survival at a time 
of infrastructural transition but is also, on the other hand, what impedes perception of the 
outside, namely, that which inspired the affirmation in the first place. Over and above the 
particular detail of the arguments he presents, Curtis’s reflexive engagement with the 
bottleneck of this impasse, this state of absolute flux, can be understood as a series of 
temporary filmic encounters with the conditions of control society, encounters that are not 
elicited by ascetic contemplation of ordinary moments but through an intense aesthetic 
expression of the ordinariness of the storytelling infrastructure itself. Let us say that such a 
practice contributes toward what might be described—somewhat speculatively—as an 
infrastructural aesthetics, a mode of essayistic filmmaking of and for the twenty-first 
century. 
Second, an infrastructural aesthetics is bound up with stories that operate within 
abstract but delimited conditions of space and time and that govern communicational form. 
Such conditions cannot be reduced to that which is rendered knowable through attempts to 
reveal an “actually existing” infrastructure of cables and servers. The representation of such 
materials is clearly politically important, but there is also a limitation to what is revealed by 
such positive knowledge. This is a key issue in broader, ongoing debates concerning visual 
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culture. For example, much of the work produced by the late essayistic filmmaker Harun 
Farocki concerned what he would eventually come to call “operative images,” by which he 
meant “images that do not represent an object, but rather are part of an operation” (2004: 
17). His films explore imaging technologies and machine vision in the context of the 
military industrial (or, latterly, entertainment) complex and, by examining the materiality of 
image making, reveal how human visual perception is susceptible to mediation by 
nonhuman systems. Today, though, the critical efficacy of any distinction between 
operative images and representational images is diminished by the infrastructural 
conditions through which the vast majority of images circulate and are assimilated. It is for 
this reason that the artist Trevor Paglen (2016) alerts us to the uncoupling of “the visual” 
from human culture and, in its place, the rising dominance of an “invisible visual culture,” 
where machine-readable images fundamental to mechanisms of control remain inaccessible 
to humans. If we are to stand any chance of comprehending this new world, he warns, “we 
need to unlearn how to see like humans.” Yet in order to avoid simply recuperating this 
invisible visual culture in a form that is recognizable to “us,” any process of unlearning 
should begin modestly and aesthetically, not by illuminating and rationalizing human-
nonhuman relations but by cultivating a sensibility to how, in an information landscape, all 
images are operative in their entanglement. Here, what becomes knowable is experienced 
only as an “arrested impression,” “an after-image on the sensorium” (Wark 2012: 54) of a 
space that otherwise remains abstract. 
Third, then, an infrastructural aesthetics also demands that we recognize the 
sensemaking qualities of images beyond the limitations of linguistic sign and referent. This 
does not involve simply dismissing the transmission of meanings and messages as if these 
processes do not occur, but it does involve accepting that such processes are both 
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inseparable from and a consequence of the transmission of affects. So instead of conceiving 
of sensemaking as an exclusively human business, in which images are interpreted 
according to how they point to the “truth” of an external and already existent reality, 
addressing infrastructural aesthetics involves recognizing the way that audiovisual 
information is systematically arranged, exchanged, concentrated, and related—procedures 
through which any truth is mediated. 
I have described this as a diagnostic process, but it can also be understood with 
reference to what Félix Guattari called “a-signifying” semiotics and its concern with 
“material intensities” (1984: 96). Like his frequent collaborator Gilles Deleuze, Guattari 
died just prior to the popular take-up of the internet and the associated development of a so-
called network society, but his theory of a-signification was nonetheless developed in 
response to a prophetic vision of contemporary mediation, and particularly of its capitalist 
context. Power, Guattari insisted, increasingly operates in the nonsignifying, 
nonrepresentational realm. It is for this reason that—just as Hans Richter and the early 
pioneers of the essay film responded to the fact that the mechanisms of capitalism have no 
intrinsic meaning that can be submitted to representation—Curtis’s films respond to a 
situation in which making sense of the contemporary world is not primarily a question of 
narrative content but is instead a matter of the largely imperceptible processes through 
which such content is fragmented into packets of potential, distributed, and rendered 
equivalent. It Felt like a Kiss and the films that followed are constructed in such a way that 
these infrastructural conditions to storytelling and sensemaking are frequently foregrounded 
and intensified, the navigation of various connections felt, the rhythms and breaks of its 
continuous discontinuity experienced as a series of forces. This is a process of sensemaking 
that is “not beholden to significations and the individuated subjects who convey them” 
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(Langlois 2014: 80) but instead operates on the preindividual level and is mediated by the 
sets of relations upon which the films depend. In his viewing suite at the BBC, Curtis 
constructs stories from hundreds of terabytes of material that is subject to categorization, 
encoding, algorithmic procedures of retrieval, and the interface effects of nonlinear editing 
software. His “pattern brain” is not his own. It is on this basis that Guattari distinguishes 
between “human” significations and another kind of semiotics “which, regardless of the 
quantity of significations they convey, handle figures of expression that might be qualified 
as ‘non-human’” (quoted in Lazzarato 2014: 84). Curtis’s films destabilize perception by 
staging reflexive encounters between the a-signifying protocols of the network and the 
cultural assumptions surrounding storytelling. In short, an infrastructural aesthetics 
unravels long held assumptions about human sensemaking. 
Fourth, it is important to reiterate that none of this amounts to a new political 
project. Intensifying the conditions of confinement does not provide a basis for resistance. 
Yet, following Guattari, this intensification can be said to affectively articulate the 
operation of a system, to “diagram” its political bearing (1984: 170). Although Curtis offers 
no call to action, at the end of Bitter Lake he does tell us that “there is something else out 
there, but we just don’t have the apparatus to see it. What is needed is a new story, and one 
that we can believe in.” His own response to this crisis suggests that, before it is possible to 
narrate such a story, it is first necessary to cultivate a sensibility toward how a system 
operates over time and, in so doing, gain dispositional awareness, an attunement to that 
system’s agency and latent potential. This may still be a kind of network pessimism, but in 
the language of recent debates in media studies, it is one that involves cultivating a 
“procedural literacy,” an infrastructural comprehension of control societies derived from an 
understanding that “any mode of expression follows particular protocols and that to fully 
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engage with that form, we must master its underlying procedures” (Mittell 2015: 54). We 
implicitly and explicitly engage in such processes when learning to play a video game, 
and—at least prior to the organizational dominance and absolute flux of platforms—when 
becoming adept at navigating the web. The functional form of Curtis’s essay films should 
be understood analogously: they activate a mode of affective knowledge, transmitting 
procedural literacy in their intensities, in the way that they feel. 
Importantly, this is not a singular endeavor; it is a process of collective attunement, 
and Curtis is not the only contemporary essayistic practitioner whose films can be said to 
contribute to this heuristic endeavor. A survey of comparable work might include The 
Sprawl (2016), by the Dutch design collective Metahaven, which is similarly concerned 
with story as a fragmentary, contradictory, and unfinished form, particularly in the online 
version of the film, intended to be viewed as a multiplicity of video “shards” in an order 
determined by the YouTube algorithm. The Sprawl experimentally maps the tendency for 
internet-enabled perception to generate connections between otherwise unconnected events 
and, in doing so, “change the nature of reality itself.” Such a survey might also include 
recent work by Hito Steyerl, such as How Not to Be Seen: A Fucking Didactic Educational 
.MOV File (2013), a performative instruction manual for destabilizing human perception at 
a time of mass surveillance, based on her “defense of the poor image” (2009). Arranged as 
a series of “lessons,” Steyerl’s film presents ironic responses to a visual regime established 
on a hierarchy of resolution, where poor images—and the infrastructure that mediates 
them—might trigger alternative modes of perception. Examples of poor images include 
those produced by the restrictions of the so-called creative industries: if Curtis’s recent 
work for the BBC iPlayer is accessible to UK viewers in a way that other more revered 
essay films are not, the majority of his work still suffers a more common fate, surviving 
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elsewhere online in the form of unauthorized copies—and copies of copies—subject to 
compression, fragmentation, reformatting, reediting. And yet these poor images are also 
“popular images—images that can be made and seen by the many” (Steyerl 2009: 41), 
images that are about their “own real conditions of existence” (44). There is, in this sense, a 
particular realism to infrastructural aesthetics—an operational realism that is neither 
narratival nor representational but is realist in what, after Galloway (2006: 84), might be 
described in terms of its affective congruence with the interactive experiences of both 
consumers and producers of digital images. 
Finally, then, and in conclusion, the notion of an infrastructural aesthetics demands 
a closer examination of the contemporary, popular moment of the essay film itself. As the 
form begins to achieve a certain ubiquity in studies of media and culture, there is a 
contradictory tendency to champion the form’s rebellious qualities, its refusal to yield to 
direct categorization, while at the same time formalizing the essay film as an object of 
study by evaluating any contemporary work against that of a small canon of twentieth-
century auteurs. It is not only cruel optimism but an inherent conservatism that permits the 
continued celebration of a supposedly nonconformist approach at the very moment that it 
expresses a new kind of conformism. In fact, it is only by attending to how the stories told 
in these films express their infrastructural conditions that studies of essayistic practice 
might offer a more significant diagnosis, a diagnosis that does not presume a capacity to 
heal. 
Notes 
1 Examples include Adam Curtis: The Desperate Edge of Now (e-flux gallery New York, 
2012), Into the Zone: A Weekend with Adam Curtis (Cinefamily, Los Angeles, 2017), and 
regular screenings at True/False festival (Columbia, Missouri, since 2005). Massive Attack 
 34 
v Adam Curtis, a 2013 series of screenings and performances, was co-commissioned by 
Park Avenue Armory (New York City), Ruhrtrennale (Duisberg, Germany), and 
Manchester International Festival (United Kingdom). 
2 Beginning in June 2009, Curtis regularly posted video material, together with 
commentary and argument, to www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/adamcurtis. By 2014 his blogging 
activities had largely wound down, and at the time of this writing he only occasionally 
resurfaces on the platform to promote the release of new films. Nonetheless, the initial use 
of this blog was highly significant to the development of his films All Watched Over by 
Machines of Loving Grace (2011) and Bitter Lake (2015). 
3 Steyerl originally poses this as a question. 
4 Aspects of The Trap (2007), particularly the opening sequence to episode 1, indicate that 
Curtis tested out the idea of “emotional coherence” prior to the more formal experiment of 
It Felt like a Kiss. 
5 Other images are of course employed more conventionally and simply provide illustrative 
support to the voiceover. 
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